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Theodorou: A Facial Reconstruction of Settlements: Analyzing the <i>Cheeks</

A FACIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF SETTLEMENTS: ANALYZING THE
CHEEKS DECISION ON FLSA SETTLEMENTS

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA "')
was established
as a means to protect the United States' poor and disenfranchised. In
recent years, courts have engrafted additionalprocedural requirements
upon the settlement of FLSA claims and, in doing so, sparked a debate
about the very nature andpurpose of the FLSA. This paper will examine
the Second Circuit's decision in Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House Inc.,
and the Cheeks approval that now must accompany any Second Circuit
settlement of a FLSA claim. This will require a closer analysis of the
legislative history of the FLSA, the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, a
detailed examination of settlements in the United States, and the case
law that has accompaniedFLSA settlements. Rule 41 and Rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are of particularimportance to the
determination of the practicaleffects of the Cheeks approval.
I. INTRODUCTION

Chris Rock once famously quipped, "I used to work at McDonald's
making minimum wage. You know what that means, when someone
pays you minimum wage? You know what your boss is trying to say?
It's like, 'Hey, if I could pay you less, I would, but it's against the
law."' 1 Modem wage law is governed by the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 19382 (hereinafter "FLSA" or "the Act"). Initially, "the employment
relationship in this country was largely one of master-servant before
Emancipation.",3 Emancipation marked the turning point in American
labor ideology, with Reconstruction values, at-will employment, the
Lochner era and the New Deal all heavily influencing postEmancipation labor law. 4 The foray of today's legal ideological war
involves influences from all of these periods in American labor law. If
1. Video: Saturday Night Live: The Best of Chris Rock (NBC Home Video 1999).
2. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2012).
3. Raja Raghunath, A FoundingFailure of Enforcement: Freedmen, Day Laborers, and the
Perilsof an Ineffectual State, 18 CUNY L. REV. 47, 54 (2014).
4. See id.(discussing major events and eras in history that influenced the modem employeremployee relationship and their effect).
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labor ideology is a war, then the settlement and voluntary dismissal of
wage claims are the figurative Tet Offensive; just when peace seems to
be within grasp, the belligerents resume their militant ways.
Voluntary dismissals through settlement are imperative to federal
civil practice, seeing as "[i]t is no exaggeration to say that most actions
are resolved by dismissal. 5 With this in mind, "[m]any litigants are
understandably reluctant to publicly disclose the terms of their
settlement agreements. ' 6 This reluctance embodies the source of
conflict for many wage claims under the FLSA.7 In order to understand
modem settlement law under the FLSA, it is necessary to delve into the
influence contract law has had upon settlements in America.
One of the earliest and most influential proponents of social
contract theory, Thomas Hobbes, exalted man's ability to contract in his
classic book Leviathan. Even when the benefits afforded by contract
were not entirely level, Hobbes posited that "[a]s if it were injustice to
sell dearer than we buy, or to give more to a man than he merits. The
value of all things contracted for is measured by the appetite of the
contractors, and therefore the just value is that which they be contented
to give."' 8 Hobbes' idea on the proliferation of independent contracting
comes into clash within the very spine of Leviathan. According to
Hobbes' social contract theory, the covenant to form the commonwealth
results from subjects relinquishing to the sovereign the right to act on
their behalf. 9 When does man's social contract to his sovereign
supersede the freedom of man's contractual capacities with himself?
Four centuries later, this question remains unanswered.
The confusion and ability of a party to settle traces its origins back
to premodem societies. 10 This ability is derived from the individual's
ability to freely contract with another; "[i]n a society that adopts the
5. Bradley Scott Shannon, Dismissing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, 52 U. OF
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 265, 265 (2014).
6. A. Jonathan Trafimow & Julia Gavrilov, 'Cheeks': RestrainingPrivateSettlements Under
FairLabor StandardsAct, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8, 2016.
7. See Nicholas M. Reiter & Brian J. Turoff, Employers May Rethink Settlement Agreements
In
2nd
Circ.,
LAW360
(Aug.
31,
2015,
12:05
PM),
https://www.law360.com/appellate/articles/696313 (discussing the reluctance that employers have
with releasing the terms of a settlement agreement and the detrimental effects it may have on the
employer).
8.

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 92 (Rod Hay ed., 1651).

9. See id at 105-06.
10. See Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract
Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 821 (1985) (discussing the lack of a
uniform body of contract law, in Roman and Medieval times, that would enforce or control
contractual relationships).
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criterion of contract as justice, no one is entitled to impose his or her
own views on others, and no one can be compelled to do anything which
he or she has not previously agreed to do."11 This liberal idea of
autonomy to contract governs to the private sphere, while the social
contract governs the public sphere.1 2 The simultaneous application of
these two contract theories permits neutrality, with respect to an
individual's visions of personal benefit, and limits the realm of
individual obligations.' 3
One skeptical legal thesis, crafted by Grant Gilmore, asserts that the
contemporary legal contract is in the process of losing its separate
identity and is being absorbed into the law of torts. 14 Inherent in this
thesis "is the rejection of the proposition that legal contracts are
intrinsically just."15 One countervailing viewpoint has advanced the
position that the social contract was experiencing a rebirth.1 6 Legal
scholar, Richard H. Coase, asserts that this paradigm shift towards the
legal disposition of freedom to contract is in part due to the rise of
corporate giants:
Corporate accumulation of wealth and power eroded
consensual freedom for outsiders contracting with
corporate behemoths. A neo-feudal corporate system of
relations based on superiors and inferiors replaced a
former system of bargained exchanges based on the
freedom of equal contracting parties. An employee had
no choice regarding contract terms and often had to
contract with 17an impersonal corporation instead of a
human being.
According to Ronald H. Coase, in The Nature of the Firm,
corporations could internalize contracts and thus eliminate the individual
consent that accompanied classical contract theory. 8 This created a
need for the sovereign to intervene on behalf 6f the minority, in

11. Id. at771.
12. See id. at 772.
13. See id.
14.

See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-90 (1974).

15.

Rosenfeld, supra note 10, at 773.

16.

See J.RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12 (1971).

17. Kevin M. Teeveen, Decline of the Freedom of Contract Since the Emergence of the
Modern Business Structure, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 117, 120-21 (1992).
at 123; Ronald H. Coase, The Nature ofthe Firm,4 Economica 386, 388 (1937).
18. See id.
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consideration of freedom of contract becoming illusory.1 9
But, while the pendulum was swinging towards the preference of
sovereign power, limitations were still in place to ensure the
preservation of the right to freely contract; "[c]ourts are increasingly
sensitive to the need to balance their views concerning what public
policy demands with the need to fix their own limitations, and generally,
whenever it is possible, the courts will interpret a contract so as to
uphold it."' 20 Courts have created a balancing test to determine whether a
contract be void by accounting for the "seriousness of any misconduct
involved and the extent to which it was deliberate, and... the directness

of the connection between that misconduct and the term., 2 1 However, it
still remains "[a]s a general rule [that] the courts do not review the
adequacy of the consideration. 22 In the instance that a "contractual
term is not specifically prohibited by legislation, courts will uphold the
term unless an otherwise identifiable public policy clearly outweighs the
23
interest in the term's enforcement.
With this in mind, it is vital that the public policy behind the FLSA

be examined in light of the contractual settlement agreements that are
often reached as the result of litigation of FLSA claims. The Act was
passed by Congress in 1938 in response to the economic downturn that
was the Great Depression.2 4 It was "designed to protect the laboring
public., 25 The Act protected against "the evil of overwork" without
statutorily required compensation.26
The FLSA established the

minimum wage and time-and-a-half overtime payments in the public and
private sectors.27

The Act would govern the wages of all employees,

except those specifically granted exemption status.2t
19. See Teeveen, supra note 17, at 129.
20. 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:3 (4th ed. 1993).
21. Sylver v. Regents Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 300 P.3d 718, 723 (Nev. 2013); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1), (3)(c, d) (FOUND. PRESS 2003).
22.

JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS, at § 4.4 (5th ed. 2003).

23. CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC v. Loop 101, LLC, 341 P.3d 452, 453 (Ariz. 2014); WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS, supra note 20 (emphasis added).
24. See Stein v. Guardsmark, L.L.C., No. 12 Civ. 4739 (JPO), 2013 WL 3809463, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013).
25. Id.; Fleming v. Tidewater Optical Co., 35 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (E.D. Va. 1940).
26. Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Chao
v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 285 (2d Cir. 2008))
27. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 §§ 6-7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207; see also U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Wages and Hours Worked: Minimum Wage and Overtime Pay, EMP. LAW GUIDE,
https://webapps.dol.gov/elaws/elg/minwage.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2017).
28. 29 U.S.C. §213(a) (exempting those employees in administrative capacities, fishermen,
farmers, newspaper publication employees, telephone switchboard operators, casual domestic
service workers, etc.)

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol35/iss1/8

4

Theodorou: A Facial Reconstruction of Settlements: Analyzing the <i>Cheeks</
2017]

A FACIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF SETTLEMENTS

FLSA rights are generally not waivable due to their statutory
nature. 29 However, there are two statutory methods for disposing of a
FLSA claim: payment of unpaid wages under the supervision of the
Secretary of Labor, 30 and a stipulated judgment agreed upon by both
31
parties.
of these
methods
that3 2has proven to be the most
problematicIt is
forthe
thelatter
American
judicial
system.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. Sleeping Dogs Awaken
Questions of legislative intent followed the passage of the FLSA
and served to confuse the functionality of the act. These questions of
legislative intent were not merely confined to the years immediately
following its passage, but instead have permeated a great deal of FLSA
settlements since the inception of the statute.33 This uncertainty of intent
has led to the 2015 case of Cheeks.34
Before Cheeks, wage-and-hour settlements in the Second Circuit
were largely conducted out of court.35 The only court involvement came
in the form of finalizing the written settlement agreement.3 6 This
involved:
[S]imply submit[ing] a stipulation of dismissal for the
court's endorsement, or agree[ing] to place the material
terms of their settlement on the record, which would
often include, inter alia, a requirement that the parties
keep their settlement confidential, and that the employee
provide the employer with a broad, general release.37
29. See, e.g., Barrentine v. Ark. Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981); Copeland v.
ABB, Inc., 521 F.3d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 2008).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c).
31. Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1353 (1lth Cir. 1982) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 216(b)).
32. See Lonny Hoffman & Christian Ward, The Limits of Comprehensive Peace: The
Example of FLSA, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 292 (2017) ("[T]he problem with this
interpretation of the text is that it treats section 216's requirement like optional guidelines,
applicable only if the employee finds it convenient to use the statute to enforce FLSA rights.").
33. See infra Part l.D.
34. See Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015).
35. See Trafimow, supranote 6.
36. See id.
37. Trafimow, supra note 6 ("[O]ften include[ing], inter alia, a requirement that the parties
keep their settlement confidential, and that the employee provide the employer with a broad, general
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The protocol for individualized FLSA claim settlements seldom
required judicial approval. 38 That is not to say that judicial
approval was
39
a rarity, but rather that no case law or statute required it.
In Cheeks, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal shut the door on
private settlements under FLSA and ruled that such settlements had to be
approved by the Court or the Department of Labor (hereinafter "DOL")
to be effective. 40 Furthermore, this prevented any FLSA settlement from
being carried out in camera.4 1 "[T]he Cheeks decision not only means
settlement agreements must be submitted for approval, but also that
approval will not be a mere rubber stamp... .,,2 By preventing in
camera settlements, the Second Circuit eliminated an integral part of
settlement agreements.43
B. PracticalEffects
This dual strike against private settlement is making it harder to
settle FLSA claims for both, employers facing FLSA claims, and
employees embroiled in litigation."a
It has been argued that the
employee's freedom to contract is abridged by the court's paternalistic
requirement of FLSA approval.4 5 Likewise, "from the management

release").
38. See Trafimow, supra note 6 ("Only in limited circumstances would parties typically
choose to submit a settlement agreement for judicial approval in an individual wage-and-hour case,
whereas collective or class action settlement of FLSA claims have always required court approval.'?
(quoting Souza v. 65 St. Marks Bistro, No. 15-CV-327, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151144, at *4-5
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2015))).
39. See Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 202 ("We start with a relatively blank slate, as neither the
Supreme Court nor our sister Circuits have addressed the precise issue before us. District courts in
our Circuit, however, have grappled with the issue to differing results.").
40. See id.
at 200, 206.
41. See id.
42. Brian W. Steinbach, Southern District of New York's Rejection of FLSA Settlement
Highlights Need to Settle on Terms That Will Pass JudicialMuster, NAT'L L. REv. (Mar. 29, 2016),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/southem-district-new-york-s-rejection-flsa-settlementhighlights-need-to-settle.
43.

See ROBIN C. LARNER & THOMAS SMITH, 3 OHIO JURIS., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE

RESOLUTION § 71 (3d ed. 2017) ("Confidentiality agreements are frequently made part of settlement
agreements; confidentiality clauses in settlement agreements are often required to 'get the deal
done."').
44. See Robert S. Whitman, Howard M. Wexler & Meredith-Anne Berger, District Court
Turns the Other "Cheeks " on PartiesProposedStipulation of Dismissal, SEYFARTH SHAW: WAGE
& HOUR LITIG. BLOG (July 11, 2016), http://www.wagehourlitigation.com/settlement/tums-theother-cheeks/#page=1.
45. See Russel Penzer, FLSA Litigation: A New Era of Judicial Protectionism?, INSIDE
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perspective, these rulings are making it difficult for defendants to settle
because they preclude confidentiality of the agreement, thereby creating
a fear of setting a public precedent for future claims. 4 6 It is noted by
some scholars that "[tihe extra work the [Cheeks] decision places on the
already overburdened federal judiciary, and the delays and costs
imposed upon plaintiffs and defendants, raise serious concerns. 4 7
Considering that FLSA claims usually settle for meager returns for both
the plaintiff and the plaintiffs attorney, there is a huge disincentive
placed on plaintiff's attorneys to take FLSA claims if judicial scrutiny
creates one more layer of delay.48 The exponential growth of FLSA
cases over the past two decades has created a "caseload crisis" in the
DOL, to which the judiciary must aid.49
A majority of federal jurisdictions mandate court or DOL approval
for the release of FLSA rights, "which often means that parties have to
file otherwise confidential settlement agreements in publicly-available
electronic court filing systems. 50 In the Second Circuit, the reasoning
behind the requirement of approval derived from the judiciary's concern
regarding employee disparagement through the prevention of the freeflowing information. 51 This prevention of freely flowing information
directly contravenes public policy. 52 Similarly, general releases for
unrelated claims and non-disparagement clauses have been dubbed off
limits since the Cheeks decision.5 3 If a release uses language indicating
the waiver of "known or unknown" claims then it is considered by the

CouNs. (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2016/08/12/flsa-litigation-a-new-era-ofjudicial-protectionis?slretum=1487631646.
46.

Jesse Butler, The Top FLSA Litigation Issues of2016-PartII, BLOOMBERG BNA: LAB.

& EMP. BLOG (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.bna.com/top-flsa-litigation-b57982078348/.
47. Daniel Wiessner, Courts, Labor Department Must Review Agreements to Drop FLSA
Claims, 2nd CircuitSays, 30 No. 3 WESTLAW J. EMP. 10, Sept. 1, 2015, at 1*.

48. See Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 207 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting
that "FLSA cases tend to settle for less than $20,000 in combined recovery and attorneys' fees, and
usually for far less than that; often the employee will settle for between $500 and $2000 dollars in
unpaid wages.")
49. Clayton Flaherty, Jessica Perry & Kathryn Mantoan, Please Pass the Settlement: Second
Circuit Widens Split Over Stipulated FLSA Dismissals, ORRICK: EMP. L. & LITIG. BLOG (Dec. 7,

2015), http://blogs.orrick.com/employment/2015/12/07/please-pass-the-settlement-second-circuitwidens-split-over-stipulated-flsa-dismissals/.
50.

See Whitman, supranote 44.

51. See Weng v. T&W Rest., Inc., No. 15-CV-08167 (PAE)(BCM), 2016 WL 3566849, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2016) (citing Lopez v. Ploy Dee, Inc., No. 15-CV-647 (AJN), 2016 WL
1626631, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2016).

52. See Trafimow, supranote 6.
53.

See id,
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54
Second Circuit to offend the FLSA.
Some strategies have emerged as a means to circumvent Cheeks in
the Second Circuit. 55 For instance, some Southern District of New York
decisions have allowed for mutual release of claims between two parties
when an FLSA claim is being asserted by a party. 56 Additionally, a
bifurcated settlement structure has been taken when non-FLSA claims
are joined by FLSA claims; no requirement of court approval would
attach to non-FLSA claims, while FLSA claims would still be subjected
to the Cheeks approval.57
Some circuits still enforce the reclusiveness of privately settled
FLSA claims, when filed without court.58 In light of this case law split,
the legislative history, precedential case law, and governing procedural
law are of the utmost importance in examining the validity of the Second
Circuit's refusal to enforce FLSA settlements without first receiving the
Cheeks approval.

III. THE ECHOES OF HISTORY
A. The Birth of the FairLabor StandardsAct
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 193359 was passed by the
U.S. Congress in an effort to stimulate the national economy in the wake
of the economic downturn of the Great Depression.60 In 1935, the
Supreme Court decision of A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States deemed the statute unconstitutional due to the far reaching breadth
of presidential discretion as a result of unlawful legislative delegation of
power. 61 President Franklin D. Roosevelt was agitated by the Supreme

54. Gonzales v. Lovin Oven Catering of Suffolk, Inc., No. 14-CV-2824 (SIL), 2015 WL
6550560, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2015).
55. See Trafinow, supra note 6.
56. See Souza v. 65 St. Marks Bistro, No. 15-CV-327 (JLC), 2015 WL 7271747, *5
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2015) ("A mutual release will ensure that both the employees and the employer
are walking away from their relationship up to that point in time without the potential for any
further disputes").
57. See Trafimow, supra note 6.
58. See Whitman, supra note 44.
59. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 105 (1933).
60. John S. Forsythe, The Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 464,464 (Summer 1939).
61. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 538-40 (1935)
("Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to
make whatever law he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of
trade or industry.").

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol35/iss1/8

8

Theodorou: A Facial Reconstruction of Settlements: Analyzing the <i>Cheeks</
20171

A FACIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF SETTLEMENTS

Court's decision and "repeatedly deplored their abandonment., 62 The
following year, the Supreme Court continued to strike down legislative
attempts to prescribe minimum wage rates.63 Even at the state level, the
Court maintained that "the State is without power by any form of
legislation to prohibit, change or nullify contracts between employers
and adult.., workers as to the amount of wages to be paid., 64 At the
time it was uncertain whether wage and hour legislation
"was beyond
65
the sphere of the state, as well as federal, activity."
The Seventy-Fifth Congress regrouped in May of 1937 with plans
for statutory amendments, constitutional amendments and even the
reorganization of the federal judiciary.66 Cooler heads prevailed as a
revised bill was quickly drafted by the Secretary of Labor, Frances
Perkins, and Sidney Hillman, the founding president of the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America.67 Senator Hugo Black
eventually proposed the bill to Congress under the name of the Black69
Connery bill, 68 and the bill would later become the FLSA.
The proposed Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937 was subject to
numerous alterations after its introduction to the floors of the Senate and
House of Representatives.7 ° The original act was proposed with a high
degree of flexibility in an effort to reach a bipartisan consensus, but not
too much flexibility as to implement drastic changes (e.g. "wages could
not be raised more than five cents in any 12-month period"). 71 The areas
subjected to the greatest congressional debate were the7 2 administrative
provisions, the wage and hour standards, and child labor.

62. See Forsythe, supra note 60, at 464.
63. See Moorehead v. New York (ex rel Tipaldo), 298 U.S. 587, 612 (1936) ("The moral
requirement, implicit in every contract of employment, viz., that the amount to be paid and the
service to be rendered shall bear to each other some relation of just equivalence, is completely
ignored. The necessities of the employee are alone considered.").
64. Id. at611.
65. Forsythe, supranote 60, at 464.
66. See id. at 464-65 ("Reports of the President's first press conference of the year indicate
that plans were being formulated to 'do something' about minimum wages as well as judicial
opposition to his program... [l]t serves to illustrate the significant fact, namely, the close ties
between federal labor standards legislation and the President's plans for 'reorganization' of the
Supreme Court.").
67. Howard D. Samuel, Troubled Passage: The Labor Movement and the Fair Labor
StandardsAct, 123 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 32, 33-34 (2000).

68. See id.
at 34.
69. See Forsythe, supra note 60, at 466.
70. See Forsythe, supra note 60, at 466. "These amendments were mainly to strengthen the
administrative portions of the act and further protect collective bargaining agreements." Id.at 468.
71. Id.at481-82.
72. See id. at 475-90.
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When comparing the original bill to the various bills that followed,
what stands out the most is the difference between the original's
handling of exemptions and the progression away from discretion at the
hands of administrations, such as the Fair Labor Standards Board.7 3
What this bill epitomized was the ideological discourse between James
Madison and James Landis.7 4
Madison believed, as illustrated in The FederalistPapers, that no
power vested in the federal government should be shared amongst any of
the three branches. 75 The "vast influence" of Montesquieu were evident
in Madison's notion of a republic's separation of powers, and
subsequently reflected in the constitution.7 6 Aside from Montesquieu,
Madison also borrowed from John Locke's wariness towards "the
concentration of power in the hands of one person." 77 Instead, each
branch of government would exert force upon the others in an effort to
check the consolidation of power in any single branch.78
Madison "embraced the concept of a divided government," 79 while
technocratic
"presidentially-coordinated
a
envisioned
Landis
government." 80 Stemming from the failures of The Great Depression,
Landis' proposition of an administrative government did not selfaggrandize rights, but rather reallocated "an assemblage of rights
normally exercisable by government as a whole., 81 The administrative
process sprang "from the inadequacy of a simple tripartite form of
government to deal with modem problems. 8 2 This divergence from the
formalism of Madison towards the functionalism of Landis is still hotly
contested by legal scholars today.83 The pendulum of popularity
73. See id. at 483-87.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 79-83.
75.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).

76. Joseph P. Rodgers, Suspending the Rule of Law? Temporary Immunity as Violative of
Montesquieu's Republican Virtue as Embodied in George Washington, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 301,
311-12 (1997).
77. Jonathan Turley, Madisonian Tectonics: How Form Follows Function in Constitutional
andArchitecturalInterpretation,83 GEO.WASH. L. REv. 305, 325 (2015).

78. Seeid. at319.
79. Id. at 325.
80. Mariano-Florentino Cubllar, James Landis and the Dilemmas of Administrative
Government, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1330, 1351 (2015).
81. Michael Ray Harris, Breaking the Grip of the Administrative Triad: Agency Policy
Making Based Under a Necessity Based Government, 83 TUL. L. REV. 273, 283 (2011) (quoting

JAMIES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 15 (Yale Univ. Press, 1938)).
82.
83.

JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-2 (Yale Univ. Press, 1938).
Compare Peter L. Strauss, Formaland Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers

Questions - A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 492-93 (1987) (praising
functionalism as necessary means to meet legislative ends), with Arnold I. Bums & Stephen J.
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between both approaches seems to swing with the changing of every
governing administration.
In the case of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937, broad
discretionary power had been placed in the hands of the Fair Labor
Standards Board in accordance with Landis' theory. 84 "As the bill
progressed, the discretion became more and more narrow and the
specific exemptions became larger and larger." 85 This embodied the
conflict between Madison and Landis. Akin to the Madisonian school of
thought, the discretion placed in the administrative agency was
speculatively scaled down due to the fear of Landis' "presidentiallycoordinated technocratic government., 86 The drafters of the legislation
sought to divest the Fair Labor Standards Board of discretion by more
specifically enumerating the boundaries of the FLSA. 87 "[G]reat
flexibility and wide administrative discretion [were] eliminated in favor
of rigid standards. 8 8 In contemplation of the discretionary power
restricted in the final act, historians of the time noted that:
It should be remembered that, while the original
characteristics
would
have
permitted
the
accomplishment of much good beyond the scope of the
present act, they also contain in themselves the seed of
many undesirable results and in the absence of an
almost super-human job of administration might have
done considerable harm to the cause they were designed
to serve. 89
These discretionary restrictions were looked upon in a positive light
by scholars, but were by no means unanimously supported. 90
On June 15, 1938, both houses approved the final amendments to
the bill. 91 After a long and arduous journey, President Roosevelt signed
Markman, UnderstandingSeparation of Powers, 7 PACE L. REv. 575, 575-77 (1987), and Peter B.
McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent,and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional
Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1994) (rejecting functionalism as an
abrogation of constitutional requirements).
84. See Forsythe, supra note 60, at 483.
85. Id. at 483.
86. See Cudllar, supra note 80, at 1351.
87. See id at 484. "Although it was not specifically mentioned, the original bill was not
intended to apply to retailers or service trades." Id.
88. Id. at 490.
89. Id.
90. See supratext accompanying notes 75-90.
91. See Samuel, supranote 67, at 36.
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the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 into law on June 28.92 With this
momentous achievement came the beginning of a near century long
conflict.
B. In the Wake of 1938
In the 1940 case Fleming v. Warshawsky, the Northern District of
Illinois held that employees of a company who brought a claim under the
FLSA were capable of waiving their claims so long as it was done
voluntarily and without coercion.93 Fleming marked one of the first
cases to specifically address the ability to settle and dismiss a claim
under the FLSA. In the initial Fleming decision, the presence of
classical contract theory is evident, in light of the decision's direct
reflection of the Second Restatement of Contracts.94 However, the
subsequent appeal of Fleming saw the judgment reversed by the Seventh
Circuit in an effort to follow a Second Circuit trend. 95 The reversal was
due in part to a reliance on the congressional declaration of policy that
aimed at "the elimination of labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for the health,
efficiency and general well-being of employees, and the eradication of
the burdens on commerce caused by such sub-standard labor
conditions. 96
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit judgment restraining employers
from failing to pay out the complete minimum wage owed to an
employee was based on the notion that an employee cannot waive his
right to the statutorily prescribed minimum wage. 97 Intent was deemed to
be irrelevant by the Seventh Circuit because any deviation from the
statutorily prescribed minimum wage would be injurious to the
congressional policy laid out in the FLSA. 98
92. See id.
93. See Fleming v. Warshawsky, 36 F. Supp. 138, 140 (N.D. Illinois 1940), rev'd, 123 F.2d
622 (7th Cir. 1941).
94. See id. at 140 ("The waivers of receipt of their respective claims were voluntarily made
without coercion."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (noting that duress
and undue influence make a contract voidable).
95. See Fleming v. Warshawsky, 123 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1941); see also U.S. ex rel
Johnson v. Morley Constr. Co., 98 F.2d 781, 789 (2d Cir. 1938) ("In any event we are not dealing
with the law of New York, but with the construction of a federal statute; and while we have found
no decision in point, we are satisfied that the statute cannot be circumvented by so easy a device.").
96. Fleming, 123 F.2d at 626 (quoting Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, 121 F.2d 285, 286
(6th Cir. 1941).
97. See id.
98. See id.
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After Fleming, two major cases came before the Supreme Court:
Brookyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil and D. A. Schulte v. Gangi.99 In
O'Neil, a settlement of a FLSA claim for overtime compensation was
made in the absence of a bona fide dispute between parties. 1°° The
employee subsequently sought liquidated damages in addition to the
settlement. 101 The question presented before the Court was whether the
employee could waive his statutory right to liquidated damages from
overtime compensation under the FLSA.10 2 The Court noted that the
statutory language, legislative reports, and congressional debates all
failed to specifically consider the issue before the Court. 10 3 In
examining the legislative intent, the Court recognized that "certain
segments of the population required federal compulsory legislation to
prevent private contracts on their part which endangered national health
and efficiency and as a result the free movement of goods in interstate
commerce." 1°4 The Court reasoned that the same policy which forbids
the waiver of the statutory minimum wage rate, forbids the waiver of
liquidated damages under the FLSA.'1 5 Allowing waiver of claims for
liquidated damages would permit an employer to circumvent the
provisions of the Act, and gain an unfair competitive advantage. 10 6 As a
result, the employee was allowed to proceed on his claim for liquidated
signed a statutory rights waiver to said
damages despite having
07
liquidated damages. 1

The following year, Gangi presented two questions about the
FLSA: whether or not an employer is covered by the Act, 10 8 and whether
employers lack the power to amicably settle FLSA claims. 10 9 In
addressing the first question, the Supreme Court looked again towards
the purpose of the FLSA. 110 Its purpose "was to secure for the lowest

99. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945); D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328
U.S. 108 (1946).
100. See O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 703 (1945).
101. See id.
102. See id. at 705.
103. See id. at 705-706.
104. Id. at 706-07.
105. See id. at 708. The Court purported to bar the waiver of liquidated damages under the
FLSA, but these holdings were invalidated by statutory language of 29 U.S.C.A. § 253(c), two years
later. See id.
106. Id. at 710.
107. See id. at 704.
108. See D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 109-10 (1946).
109. Seeid. at 113.
110. Seeid. at 116.
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paid segment of the Nation's workers a subsistence wage." ''
The
employee was deemed to take precedent over the employer. 112 As to the
second question, the Court determined "that neither wages nor the
damages for withholding them are capable of reduction by compromise
of controversies over coverage."1' 13 Statutorily prescribed minimum
wages were not able to be reduced by private contract, but the Court left
open the idea that bona fide disputes over hours could still be settled
privately. 114 Of course, these questions were secondary to the major
challenge addressed by the Court involving
the Fair Labor Standard
115
Act's relation to the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court would eventually elaborate further upon these
challenges to FLSA settlements." 6 The intent of the Act's minimum
wage provisions was to foster the "minimum standard of living
' 17
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers." "
Any settlement that did not reach the 8statutory minimum threshold
would frustrate this congressional intent."
C. Time to Take a Second Look
The cases that proceeded in the 1940's caused Congress to revisit
the FLSA. 119
The Portal-to-Portal Pay Act of 1947 was the
congressional attempt at revisiting and clarifying the extent of the
FLSA. 120
The Portal-to-Portal Pay Act further elaborated that
transportation to and from work was not compensable, 121 a statute of
limitations of two years would limit any FLSA claims, 122 and good faith
applied to FLSA claims for employers. 123 Unfortunately, the Portal-toPortal Pay Act only applied after O'Neil and Gangi as a means of
retroactive legislation thus only providing a policy argument for the
111.
112.

Id.
See id.

113.

Id.

114. See id. at 114-15.
115. See id.at 121; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124-26 (1941) (upholding
the constitutionality of the FLSA through the Commerce Clause).
116. See Barrentine v. Ark. Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 234-35 (1981).
117. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012).
118.

See Barrentine,450 U.S. at 740.

119. See e.g. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945); see also D.A. Schulte, Inc.
v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946).
120. See Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1947).
121.

Id.§ 254.

122. Id. § 255.
123. Id. §§ 259-60.
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instant issue.
For the purposes of FLSA settlement, the most notable amendment
to the FLSA is 29 U.S.C. § 253.125 In section 253, it was established that
a FLSA claim may be compromised between the parties so long as
"there exists a bona fide dispute as to the amount payable by the
employer to his employee."' 126 This compromise must be based on the
premise that the agreed upon wage rate does not fall below that of the
prescribed wages as dictated by the Fair Labor Standards Act. 127
Additionally, the amendment allows for the waiver of liquidated
of fraud or
damages in accordance with FLSA claims. 128 In the absence
129
duress, any such compromise of FLSA claims are valid.
The Portal-to-Portal Pay Act was Congress's first attempt at
addressing the settlement of FLSA claims, a facet of the FLSA which
was surprisingly omitted. 130 Despite settlement being the key concern of
the Cheeks decision, the Portal-to-Portal
Pay Act receives no
13 1
Cheeks.
of
holding
final
the
in
consideration
D. The Birth of the Cheeks Approval
Over a half century after the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, the certainty
of FLSA settlement was still largely in dispute. Simultaneously, the
popularity of FLSA claims had begun to skyrocket; "[a]ccording to
figures from PACER, litigants filed a total of 8,954 FLSA cases between
January 1, 2015, and December 31, 2015. '' 3 This swelling of FLSA

124. See George Edward Cotter, The Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation: The Portalto-PortalActofl1947, 34 VA. L. REV. 26, 54 (1948).
125. Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 253 (2017).
126. Id. § 253(a) ("Any cause of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ... to
enforce such a cause of action, may hereafter be compromised in whole or in part, if there exists a
bona fide dispute as to the amount payable by the employer to his employee; except that no such
action or cause of action may be so compromised to the extent that such compromise is based on an
hourly wage rate less than the minimum required under such Act, or on a payment for overtime at a
rate less than one and one-half times such minimum hourly wage rate.").
127. Id.
128. Id. § 253(b) ("Any employee may hereafter waive his right under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 ... to liquidated damages, in whole or in part, with respect to activities
engaged in prior to May 14, 1947.").
129. Id. § 253(c) ("Any such compromise or waiver, in the absence of fraud or duress, shall,
according to the terms thereof, be a complete satisfaction of such cause of action and a complete bar
to any action based on such cause of action.").
130. Id. §§ 251-62.
131'. See Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 199 (2d Cir. 2015).
132. Doug Hass, FLSA Minimum Wage, Overtime Lawsuits Set New Record in 2015, Filing
Growth Continues, DAY SHIFT (Jan. 4, 2016), http://dayshift.com/2016/01/04/flsa-minimum-wage-
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claims and growing settlement uncertainty would eventually culminate
into Cheeks.
In Cheeks, Dorian Cheeks, worked at "both Freeport Pancake
House, Inc. and W.P.S. Industries, Inc. (together, 'Freeport Pancake
House') as a restaurant server and manager over the course of several
years. 133 During his time at the report Pancake House, Cheeks was
owed overtime ages, and complained to his superiors about it.13 4 He
"was demoted, and ultimately fired, for complaining about Freeport
Pancake House's failure to pay him and other employees the required
overtime wage.' 35
In August 2012, Cheeks sued "under both the F[air] L[abor]
S[tandards] A[ct] and New York Labor Law" and "sought back pay,
front pay in lieu of reinstatement, and damages for the unlawful
retaliation. '' 136 These claims were initially refuted by Freeport Pancake
House, but after a period of discovery a settlement was reached; "[t]he
parties then filed a joint stipulation and order of dismissal with prejudice
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)."' 137 The Honorable Judge Joanna
Seybert of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York rejected the stipulation and insisted that parties could not
privately settle FLSA claims. 138 Instead, the stipulation had to be
presented to the district court or DOL for approval with an 1affidavit
39
exhibiting why the proposed settlement was fair and reasonable.
E. The Second Circuit'sDecision
Subsequently, the issue that faced the Second Circuit on appeal was
"whether parties may settle FLSA claims with prejudice, without court
approval or DOL supervision, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(hereinafter "FRCP") 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).' 4 ° Court approval is predicated
on whether or not the FLSA is classified under the "applicable federal
overtime-lawsuits-set-new-record-in-2015-filing-growth-continues/1352/. Between 2011 and 2014,
FLSA claims had experienced a 30% increase in federal courts. Id. This has been part of an evergrowing trend that was catalyzed by the economic turmoil of 2007 and 2008. See Christen
Caulfield, Employment Suits Still Rock the Docket, LAw360 (Nov. 19, 2008, 12:00 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/77545/employment-suits-still-rock-the-docket.
133. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 200.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
at 200-01.
140. Id.at201.
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statute" exemption of the FRCP Rule 41(a)(1)(A). 141 The Court based
its analysis on O'Neil and Gangi.142 In conjunction with these cases, it
was noted
that a circuit split existed within the Eleventh and Fifth
143
Circuits.

The Second Circuit also acknowledged Picerni v. Bilingual Seit &
Preschool, Inc., in which the Eastern District of New York found the
absence of explicit exemption under Rule 41, to be dispositive of its
non-exempt status. 144 To further clarify, under Rule 41, if the Picerni
court had found the FLSA to achieve the "applicable federal statutes"
145
exempt status, then court approval would be necessary for settlement.
Simply put, exemption means approval is necessary.
The Cheeks court determined that the governing FRCP rule for
FLSA claims is Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and that the FLSA does receive
exemption status from the rule as it is not one of the "applicable federal
statutes.' 46 At the conclusion of the appeal, FLSA settlements were
deemed to require court or DOL approval in order to have prejudicial
effect. 147

On January 11, 2016, Dorian Cheek's petition for writ of certiorari
was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. 148 The attorney
of Dorian Cheeks indicated that the "Supreme Court... rather than the
Second Circuit, should be the one to settle 'an important matter of
federal law' such as the one presented in the case, according to his
petition." 149 An attorney representing Cheeks stated:
[T]hat while there were 'excellent reasons' for the
Supreme Court to weigh in on the matter, the Second
Circuit's decision in the instant case may end up helping
plaintiffs, such as by limiting or eliminating general
releases and by reminding lower courts and litigants that
the FLSA's purpose is to protect employees, rather than
141. See Hester Indus., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 160 F.3d 911, 916 (2d Cir. 1998).
142. See Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 202.
143. See id. at 203-04.
144. See id. at 204-05 (citing Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368,
373 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)).
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A).
146. See Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 206.
147. See id. at 201-02.
148. See Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 824 (2016).
149. Kevin Penton, Justices Won't Eye Court Sign-Offfor PrivateFLSA Deals, LAw360 (Jan.
11, 2016, 6:41 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/744985/justices-won-t-eye-court-sign-off-forprivate-flsa-deals.
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employers. 150
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari could "cast doubt on tens
of thousands of FLSA cases discontinued with prejudice, and without
court approval nationwide, and would create chaos in the judicial
'
system."151
Likewise, dangerous legal implications could loom on the
horizon; FLSA claims of individual contractors, like those employed by
Uber, and unpaid interns could be extremely problematic in the wake of
the Cheeks decision. It is for this reason that the exploration of Cheeks
and the alternatives to the Cheeks approval are necessary to examine.
IV. ANALYZING CHEEKS

A. Improper Reliance
In reaching its conclusion, the Cheeks court based most of its
argument on the decisions of O 'Neil and Gangi.5 2 This legal analysis is
sound, except for the omission that O'Neil and Gangi were decided in
1945 and 1946, respectively. 5 3 Both cases based their arguments off of
54
the congressional intent that the courts read into the passage of FLSA. 1
The problem with basing the Cheeks decision off of O 'Neil and Gangi is
that both cases fail to take into consideration the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act
of 1947 which amended the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.'
The
Portal-to-Portal Pay Act illustrated a congressional intent that
contradicted the perceived intent that was relied upon in the decisions of
56
0'Neil and Gangi.1
In section 253 of the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, compromise is

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 202.
153. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945); see also D.A. Schulte, Inc. v.
Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946).
154. See 0 'Neil, 324 U.S. at 706-08; see also Gangi, 328 U.S. at 113.
155. See O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 698-99; see also Gangi, 328 U.S. at 122.
156. Compare Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 253 (1947) ("Any such compromise or
waiver, in the absence of fraud or duress, shall, according to the terms thereof, be a complete
satisfaction of such cause of action and a complete bar to any action based on such cause of
action."), with Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 713 (1945) ("We are of the opinion
that the legislative history and provisions of the Act support a view prohibiting such waiver."), and
D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 115 (1946) ("The reasons which lead us to conclude that
compromises of real disputes over coverage which do not require the payment in full of unpaid
wages and liquidated damages do not differ greatly from those which led us to condemn the waivers
of liquidated damages in the O'Neil case.").
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specifically enunciated as being permissible so long as the terms of the
settlement fall within the parameters of prescribed minimum wage of the
FLSA. 157 The only limitations placed upon the settlement are those that
would render a contract unenforceable (e.g. fraud or duress). 158 This
evinces the idea that the congressional intention for the FLSA was no
farther reaching than that of contract law. Fast forward to 2015 courts
had concocted a multi-factor test for the determination of FLSA
settlement approval, as well as a four-factor test that weighed against
settlement approval.159 Case law had substantively strayed far from the
limitations set in place by § 253(c). As a result, it is important to take a
closer examination of the procedural grounds upon which Cheeks was
decided.
B. ProceduralSettlement Requirementsfor Rule 41 (a)(1)
The FRCP "became effective September 16, 1938, just less than
150 years after the federal judicial system was established in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.,,160 The FRCP was preceded by the FLSA, which
was initially enacted on June 25, 1938.161 To further clarify, the FRCP
was made effective four months after the passage of the FLSA. For this
reason, the governing procedure of FLSA claims under the FRCP is not
easily ascertainable; legislative intent towards the FRCP is not present
within the confines of the FLSA. In fact, the only mention of procedure
in the FLSA is in the March 23, 2010 amendment, 29 U.S.C.A. §
218c.

162

Rule 41(a)(1) has never been the most popular rule among
academics. Frequent calls for the repeal or amendment have permeated
the history of the FRCP:
Relatively early in the history of the Federal Rules,
several commentators argued that Federal Rule 41(a)(1)
should be repealed. This would have made all voluntary
157. See 29 U.S.C. § 253(a).
158. See id. § 253(c).
159. See Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC, 96 F.Supp. 3d 170, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); but see Li
Rong Gao v. Perfect Team Corp., No, 10-CV-1631 (ENV) (CLP), 2017 WL 1434491 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 21, 2017) (declining to require Cheeks approval when dealing with a bankruptcy settlement for

a litigation posture analogous to the present action).
160. See Donald J. Savery et al., A History of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, in 46
MASS. PRAC., FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE § 2:4 (2d ed., 2016).

161.
162.

See 29 U.S.C. § 201.
See id. § 218(b).
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dismissals -discretionary with the district judge, thereby
allowing the court to weigh the particular equities of the
impose needed conditions on a case by
situation and
163
basis.
case
This initial call for Rule 41(a)(1) was not pursued by the advisory
Even
committee, 164 but this did nothing to stem the demand for change.
165
leading up to 2014, scholars were heavily critical of the rule.
In deciding Cheeks, the Second Circuit noted that the FLSA is
silent as to Rule 41 and its provisions regarding the dismissal of
actions.166 The notable FLSA procedural vacancy gave rise to the case
law classification of FLSA claim settlements as exceptions under Rule
41(a)(1). 167 As dictated by FRCP 41(a)(l)(A)(ii), a voluntary dismissal
by the plaintiff without a court order is permissible so long as it is
"[s]ubject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and any applicable
federal statute.' ' 168 If the claim is subject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2,
66 and any applicable federal statute, then "the plaintiff may dismiss an
action without a court order by filing.., a stipulation of dismissal
signed by all parties who have appeared. 1 69 The Cheeks court took a
firm stance and held "that absent [court or DOL] approval, parties
cannot settle their FLSA claims through a private stipulated dismissal
with prejudice pursuant to [Rule] 41(a)(l)(A)(ii)," thus rendering it an
exception to the "any applicable federal statute" language under Rule
41.170

After Cheeks, a question of whether court approval or DOL
supervision was necessary for a settlement to have prejudicial effect
under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) continued to linger.' 71 No case spoke directly
163. Charles Alan Wright et al., Voluntary Dismissal as a Matter of Right, 9 FED. PRAC. &
PROC. CIv. § 2363 (3d ed., 2016).
164. Id.
165. Shannon, supra note 4 at 265 ("It is time for more substantial change. Regardless of
whether Rule 41 ever served its purpose--or even represented a correct statement of the relevant
law-it has become increasingly apparent that the rule is not adequately aligned with the realities of
modem federal practice.").
166. Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2015).
167. See id. at 201, 206.
168. FED. R. CIv. P. 41 (emphasis added). In Cheeks, "[t]he DOL submitted a letter brief on
March 27, 2015, taking the position that the FLSA falls within the 'applicable federal statute'
exception to Rule 41(a)(1)(A), such that the parties may not stipulate to the dismissal of FLSA
claims with prejudice without the involvement of a court or the DOL." Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 201.
169. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
170. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 200.
171. LOR/WH REPORT LETrER, No. 1142, LAB. & EMPL. L. 9010403 (C.C.H., 2015), 2015
WL 9010403.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol35/iss1/8

20

Theodorou: A Facial Reconstruction of Settlements: Analyzing the <i>Cheeks</
A FACIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF SETTLEMENTS

2017]

to the issue of whether the FLSA is an "applicable federal statute" under
Rule 41(a)(1)(A), 172 until Martinez v. Ivy League School, Inc. In
Martinez, the plaintiff commenced an action for unpaid minimum wages
and overtime wages .owed in the Eastern District of New York. 173 The
"plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal 'with prejudice' pursuant
to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 174 The
Eastern District of New York noted that the two parties had come to
terms, but refused to enforce the settlement until court approval was
granted or a memorandum was filed as to why court approval was not
necessary. 175 When faced with the Order to Show Cause, the plaintiff
contended that the Cheeks approval was limited to prejudicial dismissals
176
in accordance with Rule 41 (a)(1)(A)(ii), not Rule 41 (a)(1)(A)(i).
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) allowed for the possibility of settlement with "a
notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or
a motion for summary judgment."1 77 To determine whether or not the
Cheeks approval would extend to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), the Eastern
District of New York followed Cheeks analysis. 178 The Martinez court
based its decision off of Santos v. Gomez, LLC.179 In Santos, the court
noted that "[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not overrule the
FLSA's substantive requirement of a court-approved settlement."180 The
Martinez court found this to be compelling and ordered the plaintiff
"provide this court with the specifics of the settlement to enable the
Court to determine whether it is fair and reasonable., 181 In doing so, the
Cheeks approval was expanded to Rule 41 (a)(1)(A)(i).
The problem with the Martinez court's reliance on the Santos
decision is that the FLSA has no stated "substantive requirement of a
court-approved settlement."18' 2 This "substantive requirement" was
judicially manifested in Lynn's Food Stores, Inc.' 83 In Lynn's Food
Stores, the Eleventh Circuit based its "substantive requirement of court-

172.

See id.

173. Martinez v. Ivy League Sch., Inc., No. 15-CV-7238(DRH)(GRB), 2016 WL 3582062, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2016).
174. Id.
175. See id.
at 2.
176. See id.
at 1-2.
177. FED. R. CrV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
178. See Martinez, 2016 WL 3582062, at *3.
179. See id.
180. Santos v. Gomez, LLC, 2013 WL 4523492, at 1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2013).
181. See Martinez, 2016 WL 3582062, at *3.
182. Id. at *3.
183. Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (1lth Cir. 1982).
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approval" off of Brooklyn Savings Bank.184 As mentioned previously,
Brooklyn Savings Bank failed to account for the FLSA amendment that
is the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act of 1947, which specifically provided for
FLSA settlement, yet made no mention of court-approval. 185 It is under
this line of legal analysis that the Cheeks approval was expanded to
FRCP 41 (a)(1)(A)(i).
The Eastern District of New York, on one occasion, has disregarded
the precedent set by the Cheeks decision as it relates to Rule 41.186 The
court regarded claims that are "infinitesimally small" to not be subjected
to the strict statutory standards of the FLSA and thus dismissible under
Rule 41(a)(2). 8 7 Here, the distinction between Rule 41(a)(1) and Rule
41(a)(2) comes into effect. Because the court's consideration is
statutorily tied into Rule 41(a)(2), a claim below the statutory standard
may be overlooked, so long as it is an insignificant amount and not
economically feasible to continue to pursue or dispute. 88 This commonsense approach could potentially spell out a new method of judicial
scrutiny.
C. Without PrejudiceException
Immediately after the decision in Cheeks, the Southern District of
New York was confronted with the issue of whether a voluntary
dismissal without prejudice of an FLSA claim may be permitted in
Reynoso v. Norman's Cay Group LLC.189
In Reynoso, it was
acknowledged that Cheeks prevented the settlement of claims with
prejudice, but settlements without prejudice were still permissible. 90
This decision was later echoed by the Eastern District of New York in
the case Dawidowicz v. Black Square Builders Corp.191 Despite this,
settlements without prejudice are a rather hollow victory for employers;
therefore alternate methods of dispute resolution have been
experimented with since the Cheeks decision in 2015.

184. Id. at 1353 n.8.
185. See infra, Part 1lI
Section A.
186. See Gao v. Perfect Team Corp., 10-CV-1637 (ENV)(CLP), 2016 WL 413095, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. 2016).
187. Id. at*l-2.
188.

Id.

189.

See Reynoso v. Norman's Cay Grp., 15 Civ. 1352 (PAE), 2015 WL 10098595, at *1

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2015).

190. See id.
191. See Dawidowicz v. Black Square Builders Corp., 15 CV 7380 (FB) (CLP), 2016 WL
7665417, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y.Nov. 8, 2016).
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D. Rule 68 Exception
A month after the Cheeks decision, the Eastern District of New
York held that "Cheeks should be confined to the [FRCP] Rule 41
context, and does not reach an Offer of Judgment under [FRCP] Rule
68. " 192 An offer ofjudgment under Rule 68(a) is made when:
At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party
defending against a claim may serve on an opposing
party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms,
with the costs then accrued. If, within 14 days after
being served, the opposing party serves written notice
accepting the offer, either party may then file the offer
and notice of acceptance, plus193proof of service. The
clerk must then enter judgment.
This mandate for a clerk to enter judgment is in stark contrast with
Cheeks. There is no room for judicial intervention. Similarly, FRCP
68(c) states that:
When one party's liability to another has been
determined but the extent of liability remains to be
determined by further proceedings, the party held liable
may make an offer of judgment. It must be served
within a reasonable time -but at least 14 days - before
the date set for a hearing to determine the extent of
liability. 194

For offers of judgment no catch-all is provided for "any applicable
federal statute."' 95 As stated in Barnhill v. Fred Stark Estate, "In that
way, [Rule 68] is narrower than Rule 41, because while the latter,
subject to its stated qualifications, permits dismissal for any or no

192. Barnhill v. Fred Stark Estate, No. 15-CV-3360 (BMC), 2015 WL 5680145, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2015); see also Sagardia v. AD Delivery & Warehousing, Inc., 15-CV-677
(CBA)(RLM), 2016 WL 4005777, at * 1 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2016) (noting the uncertainty of
whether Cheeks applied to Rule 68 offers ofjudgment).
193. FED. R. CIv. P. 68(a).
194. FED. R. C1V. P. 68(c).
195. Barnhill, 2015 WL 5680145, at *1.
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reason-for example, a change of heart by the plaintiff, or a
settlement-Rule 68, by its terms, requires entry of judgment., 196 By
contrasting the "Cheeks approval" of Rule 41 to Rule 68 the paradox is
evident; a plaintiff is unable to voluntarily dismiss a FLSA claim
without court approval, but a defendant may instigate settlement through
an offer of judgment which, upon acceptance by the plaintiff, the clerk
must then enter judgment. 197 To put it in the elegant words of the Baba
v. Beverly Hills Cemetery Corp. Inc. court, "the Rule 68 Offer of
Judgment procedures gives clever defendant-employers an aperture the
size of the Grand Canyon through which they can drive coercive
settlements in Fair Labor Standards Acts cases without obtaining court
approval.' 9 8
The court in Barnhill recognized the FLSA's classification by prior
courts as a "uniquely protective statute," but rejected the notion that the
Act is truly as unique as the courts purport it to be. 199 As a result of this,
the court declined to extend the "Cheeks approval" to Rule 68.200 The
Barnhill court states, "Unlike Rule 41, as construed in Cheeks, Rule 68
has no 'hook,' no limiter, that restricts its use and that would permit
20 1
excluding the F[air] L[abor] S[tandards] A[ct] from its reach.",
Attorneys have begun formulating settlement agreements during
negotiations and submitting them as Rule 68 offers as a way to
circumvent Cheeks.2 °2
An exception to this circumvention exists in the realm of opt-in
collective actions under the FLSA. °3 The mootness of a Rule 68 offer
must be assessed by a court.20 4 If all the available relief sought by a
plaintiff is contained in the offer, then the case is moot. 20 5 In the
196. Id. ("Rule 68 provides when an offer of judgment is accepted, the Clerk must then enter
judgment") (Emphasis added) (internal quotations marks omitted).
197. Compare Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015)
(requiring court approval for settlements in FLSA claims), with Barnhill, 2015 WL 5680145, at *1
(allowing parties in FLSA claims to settle without court approval as long as the plaintiff accepted
the offer of judgment).
198. Baba v. Beverly Hills Cemetery Corp., 15 Civ. 5151 (CM), 2016 WL 2903597, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 9,2016).
199. Barnhill,2015 WL 5680145, at *2.
200. See id. at *2-3.
201. id. at *1.
202. See Butler, supra note 47.
203. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2017) ("No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court
in which such action is brought.").
204. See Ward v. Bank of N.Y., 455 F. Supp. 2d 262, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
205. See Weis v. Fein, Such, Kahn & Shepard, P.C., No. OlCiv. 1086 (AGS), 2002 WL
449653, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. March 22, 2002).
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instance that the relief is insufficient, the case is not moot. 206

The

question of mootness is further complicated by opt-in plaintiffs. "If no
additional plaintiffs opt in to the lawsuit, the FLSA section 16(b)
plaintiff advances only her own individual claims., 20 7 If other plaintiffs
opt in then the adequacy of the Rule 68 offer must be considered in light
of the additional plaintiffs.20 8 In short, collective action Rule 68 offers
may prove to be more problematic to employers than initially
anticipated.
E. The FairLabor StandardsAct is Holier Than Thou
The Cheeks court, in reaching its decision, qualified the FLSA as a
"uniquely protective statute., 20 9 This "uniquely protective" status has
been further catalogued by case law. 210 The implicit assumption, that the
FLSA is "uniquely protective" is nothing more than a thin veneer to
mask the bolstering of sovereign powers. As the Eastern District of New
York noted in Barnhill:
[S]urely, that evil is no greater than a case where a
police officer gratuitously beats a suspect (42 U.S.C. §
1983), or a debt collector threatens children that their
father will be imprisoned if he does not pay his bill (Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act), or a consumer's credit is
ruined because of a falsely reported debt (Fair Credit
Reporting Act), or an employee is forced to submit to
unwanted
sexual advances or face termination (Title
211

VID).

The court's true fear resided in the abuse of employee, not by his
own employer, but by his attorney.212 This fear belies the malpractice
206. See Lovelace v. United States, No. 00 Civ. 1274 (LTS)(THK), 2001 WL 984686, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2001).
207. Ward v. Bank ofN. Y., 455 F. Supp. 2d at 267; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
208. See Gonyer v. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc. 32 F. Supp. 3d 514, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
209. Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 207 (2d Cir. 2015).
210. See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945); D.A. Schulte, Inc. v.
Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 116 (1946); Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352
(1 1th Cir. 1982).
211. Barnhill v. Fred Stark Estate, No. 15 Civ. 3360 (BMC), 2015 WL 5680145, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2015).
212. See, e.g., Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC, 96 F. Supp. 3d 170, 176, 181-82 (S.D.N.Y.
2015); Guareno v. Vincent Perito, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 1635, 2014 WL 4953746, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
26, 2014).
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element that "the attorney owed the plaintiff the duty of professional
care and breached that duty., 21 3 By the basic rules of economics, selfinterest drives attorneys to abide by this duty of care in order to maintain
clientele and keep their license to practice.
It could be argued that once a plaintiff invokes the
jurisdiction of the court by bringing an FLSA collective
action, the court assumes the responsibility to see to it
that its processes have not been used to the detriment of
employees who have
not yet received notice that the
214
action is pending.
In Cheeks, this idea stems from the perceived abuse of employees at
the hands of the legal system:
In Nights of Cabiria,the proposed settlement agreement
included (1) a battery of highly restrictive
confidentiality provisions ... in strong tension with the
remedial purposes of the FLSA; (2) an overbroad
release that would waive practically any possible claim
against the defendants, including unknown claims and
claims that have no relationship whatsoever to wageand-hour issues; and (3) a provision that would set the
fee for plaintiffs attorney at between 40 and 43.6
percent of the total settlement payment without adequate
documentation to support such a fee award. 15
"Of course, with 8,126 FLSA cases filed in 2014, it is precarious to
rely on anecdotal instances. 21 6 FLSA filings have increased some
400% nationwide since 2001 and now comprise nearly nine percent of
all new civil cases in the Southern District of New York.2 17
In relying on the "unique policy considerations" underlying the
213. Judith F. Goodman & Sue C. Jacobs, Attorney Malpractice: What It Is and How Not to Do
It,
AM.
B.
ASS'N,
Spring
1998,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/gp-solo magazine home/gp-solo ma
gazine index/goodman.html.
214. Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
215. Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Lopez'
v. Nights of Cabiria, 96 F. Supp. 3d 170, 177-81 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 2015)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
216. Barnhill,2015 WL 5680145, at *2.
217. See Fujiwara v. Sushi Yasuda Ltd., 58 F. Supp. 3d 424,429 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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FLSA, the Cheeks court offered several cases of gross abuse of the
statute in settlement agreements that rightfully were rejected by the
courts, like secret settlements meant to shield the result from other
employees, 2 18 unreasonable allocation of recoveries as attorneys' fees at
the expense of the plaintiff,219

or restrictions on the ability of the

plaintiff's attorney to represent other employees.220 Even prohibitions
on future employment have been deemed to be "abuses by unscrupulous
employers" as a result of the disparate bargaining power between
employer and employee.221
In Barnhill,the court noted that:
[M]ost of the litigation to protect the vulnerable under
remedial legislation is attorney-driven as a result of feeshifting provisions, but it does not follow that there is a
pervasive problem of attorneys favoring themselves at
their clients' expense that is peculiar to the FLSA and
that requires the courts to police every Rule 68 offer in
FLSA cases for abuse. 22
It remains to be seen how such a small sample size can be
extrapolated to be representative of the rapidly growing FLSA claims. It
has been interpreted by courts in the wake of Cheeks that judicial review
of the fee arrangement between an FLSA plaintiff and his counsel is
required by of the court.223 This extension of the court's duty is merely
illustrative of the absurd paternalism that has extended to FLSA
plaintiffs.224

218.

SeeLopez, 96F. Supp. 3dat 177-78.

219. See id. at 181-82. Courts have grown wary of these types of settlements in an effort to
combat these practices. Siddiky v. Union Square Hosp. Grp., LLC, 5 Civ. 9705 (JCF), 2017 WL
2198158, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2017) ("It is therefore within the discretion of the court-to
reallocate funds between the class and Class Counsel if that is necessary to assure a fair outcome.").
220. See Guareno v. Vincent Perito, Inc., No. 14 CV1635, 2014 WL 4953746, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 26, 2014).

A

221. Medina v. Almar Sales Co., No. 16 Civ. 4107 (HBP), 2017 WL 3447990, at "3 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 10, 2017).
222. Barnhill v. Fred Stark Estate, No. 15 Civ. 3360 (BMC), 2015 WL 5680145, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2015).
223. See Garcia v. YSH Green Corp., 16 Civ. 532 (HBP), 2016 WL 677 9630, at *n.1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2016).
224. See Penzer, supranote 45.
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F. ExaminingAttorney's Fees
Many attorneys have found that a court's examination of attorney's
fees to be a strong disincentive to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) settlements.225
By examining the record, courts attempt to find "sufficient justification"
for the attorney's fees by calculating the percentage of the total
settlement that the fee encompasses.226 Additionally, courts seek
justification for the initial22 fee
arrangement, billable hours and a
7
costs.
of
between
breakdown
This examination into attorney's fees is perceived as more of a
hindrance to employee attorneys because employer billing records are
not necessary in assessing the reasonableness of employee billing
records.228 Many attorneys seek to avoid fairness hearings, so courts do
not assess their billing hours. 229 There are undocumented ways that
plaintiffs' attorneys go about circumventing the court's wary eye. One
rumored method involves employee attorneys hiding their billing hours
within the actual wage settlement amount, thus tricking judges in
fairness hearings into perceiving the wage an hour claim settlement to be
inflated, while not alerting the judges to attorney's fees that exceed the
norm.230 This is only a rumored perception of ways to circumvent
judicial scrutiny, but courts have begun to
carefully analyze the
231
monetary allocations of settlements as a result.
Another method of circumventing judicial scrutiny lies in Rule
68.232 Lincoln was once quoted along the lines of:
[H]e used to liken the case to that of the boy who,
when asked how many legs his calf would have if he
called its tail a leg, replied, "Five," to which the prompt
response was made that calling the tail a leg would not

225. See Panel at Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal Round Table Discussion: PostCheeks Wage & Hour Settlements (Jan. 25, 2017).
226. See Lopez v. Poko-St. Ann L.P., 176 F. Supp. 3d 340, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
227. See id.
228. See Souryavong v. Lackawanna Cty., 159 F. Supp. 3d 514, 543-44 (M.D. Penn. 2016).
229. See Panel at Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal Round Table Discussion: PostCheeks Wage & Hour Settlements (Jan. 25, 2017).
230. See Panel at Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal Round Table Discussion: PostCheeks Wage & Hour Settlements (Jan. 25, 2017).
231. See Panel at Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal Round Table Discussion: PostCheeks Wage & Hour Settlements (Jan. 25, 2017); see also Siddiky v. Union Square Hosp. Grp.,
LLC, 15 Civ. 9705 (JCF), 2017 WL 2198158, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2017).
232.

See FED. R. CIv. P. 68; see also supra Part 1HI.D.
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make it a leg. 233
Some jurists quip along these lines that relabeling method of mode
are
of settlement does not change its unlawful nature.234 Many jurists
235
still highly skeptical of the problems that Rule 68 offers present.
With the fear of attorney abuse in mind, the public policy of FLSA
has been the basis of all of the procedural decisions leading toward, as
236
The application of
well as stemming from, the Cheeks decision.
public policy in FLSA settlements has been largely unilateral due to an
apparent unwillingness to apply policies against the FLSA narrative.
"[P]ublic policy also requires that parties of full age and competent
understanding must have the greatest freedom of contracting, and
contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, must be upheld and
enforced by the courts. 237 This contrary narrative comes dangerously
close to the dreaded "L" word: Lochner.
G. The Specter of Lochner
In 1905, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a seminal
case about the imposition of a limitation of employment in bakeries to
sixty hours which was imposed by article 8, chapter 415, section 110 of
the Laws of 1897.238 The Court noted that "[t]he statute necessarily
interferes with the right of contract between the employer and
employees, concerning the number of hours in which the latter may
labor in the bakery of the employer. ' 239 The issue was that of Fourteenth
Amendment applicability; "[t]he general right to make a contract in
relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution., 240 In short,

233.

REMINISCENCES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN BY DISTINGUISHED MEN OF HIS TIME 242 (Allen

Thomdike Rice ed., Harper & Brothers Publishers 1909).
234. See Panel at Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal Round Table Discussion: PostCheeks Wage & Hour Settlements (Jan. 25, 2017).
235. See Panel at Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal Round Table Discussion: PostCheeks Wage & Hour Settlements (Jan. 25, 2017).
236. See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 719 (1945); D.A. Schulte, Inc. v.
Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 116 (1946); Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1354
(11 th Cir. 1982); Martinez v.Ivy League Sch., Inc., 15-CV-7238 (DRH) (GRB), 2016 WL 3582062,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2016); Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, 96 F. Supp. 3d 170 (S.D.N.Y. March
30, 2015).
237. 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:3 (4th ed.).
238. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905).
239. Id. at 53.
240. Id. at 53; see also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (finding the Federal
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the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment would prevent state
limitations on an individual's right to contract.24 1
In the wake of Lochner, there was a hotly contested friction
between the governmental power to regulate, and the Fourteenth
Amendment and Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause.24 2 This
friction is still evident in the Cheeks approval because the balance
between private contractual settlements and the government's power to
regulate is once again being examined. During the Lochner era,
Under strict Benthamite theory, all such laws [abridging
an individual's right to contract] were idle and vicious:
idle, because the whole wage contract was controlled by
factors over which the collective will of the community
had no control; vicious, because it put restraint upon the
'natural' and inevitable adjustment of industry.243
The Benthamite theory was embodied in the Lochner decision,2
245
but experienced contention in many decisions leading up to Lochner.
Disagreement within the Supreme Court itself was notable, but none
more notable than that of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.246
Constitution violated by state statute).
241. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57 ("There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the
liberty of person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of
a baker. There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to
men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able to assert their rights and care for
themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfering with their independence of judgment
and of action.").
242. See Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-HourDay, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495,
495-96 (1908) ("But the meaning of the words 'due process of law' or 'the law of the land' has not
become settled.").
243. Id.at 501.
244. See id.
245. See, e.g., Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 22 (1901) ("[T]his court held that
it was competent for the legislature of Missouri to pass such a law even though it places a limitation
upon the right of contract."); St. Louis Iron Mountain Ry. Co. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404, 410 (1899)
("[T]he act was passed 'for the protection of servants and employe[e]s of railroads,' and was upheld
as an amendment of railroad charters, such exercise of the power reserved being justified on public
considerations, and a duty was specially imposed, for the failure to discharge which the penalty was
inflicted. The penalty was sustained because the requirement was valid."); Holden v. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366, 397 (1898) ("Though reasonable doubts may exist as to the power of the legislature to
pass a law, or as to whether the law is calculated or adapted to promote the health, safety or comfort
of the people, or to secure good order or promote the general welfare, we must resolve them in favor
of the right of that department of government."); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205,
209 (1888) ("Such legislation does not infringe upon the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requiring equal protection of the laws, because it is special in its character ....).
246. See Allen Mendenhall, Justice Holmes and Conservatism, 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 305,
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Holmes preached judicial restraint above all else-and preferred
deference to state legislation.24 7 His devotion to judicial restraint and his
fear of judicial tyranny were such that he once wrote, "[flf my fellow
citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job., 248 Holmes
based the belief that "a judge should not impose his personal ideology
onto a populace" on his Civil War service; the war had ingrained in him
a disdain for "avoidable conflicts between different cultures trying to
impose their norms on each other and intensely disliked those who
claimed to know what was true or right with absolute certainty., 249 This
paints an enigmatic and slightly contradictory picture because it permits
states to make decisions for citizens without implicating the Fourteenth
Amendment. Simultaneously, lawmakers may be of a different culture
or socioeconomic background than the constituents against whom the
law is imposed upon.
After much debate, the end of the Lochner era was instigated by
Nebbia v. New York. 250 Lochner quickly became unpopular, but a recent
trend has seen it revisited as a pivotal transitional period in United States
jurisprudence. 25 1 "A flood of new Lochner scholarship refutes the idea
that the Court substituted its wisdom for the legislature's to support of
laissez-faire economics, favoring a number of other theories. The work
of these Lochner revisionists has done much to ameliorate the sting of
the charge of 'Lochnerism.' ' 252 Once again, the Lochner question has
reared its ugly head in regard to private FLSA settlements: are federal
limitations a violation of an individual's right to contract? Jurisdictional
conflict has given no clear answer to this question. 3
310 (Spring 2013).
247. See id. at 311.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) ("The Fifth Amendment, in the field
of federal activity, and the Fourteenth, as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental
regulation for the public welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by
securing that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process. And the
guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial
relation to the object sought to be attained."). ,
251. See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Be Careful What You Wish For: Why McDonald v. City of
Chicago's Rejection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad Thing, 155

PENN. ST. L. REv. 561, 587 (Winter 2011).
252. Id.
253. See Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982)
("FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this would nullify the
purposes of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectuate.") (citations
omitted); but see Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 631 (W.D. Tex. 2005)
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H. The Circuits in Disagreement
The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits have presented diametrically
opposing views on the issue of private settlement. The Eleventh Circuit
was first to denounce private settlement of wage claims under the FLSA
in Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. In Lynn's Food Stores, the DOL determined
that Lynn's Food Stores (hereinafter "Lynn's") owed back wages to its
employees in violation of the FLSA.254 Lynn's attempted to negotiate
with the DOL, but after not finding success, directly approached its
employees. 255 "Lynn's offered its employees $1000.00, to be divided
among them on a pro rata basis, in exchange for each employee's
agreement to waive 'on behalf of himself (herself) and on behalf of the
U. S. Department of Labor' any claim for compensation arising under
the FLSA.' ' 256 Several employees accepted this agreement, but DOL
calculations remarked that this settlement would insufficiently meet the
wages owed under the FLSA.2 57 Lynn's attempted to gain court
258
approval and the challenge was elevated to the Eleventh Circuit.
After review of a record of transaction of the settlement, it was
perceived by the Eleventh Circuit that "the transcript provides a virtual
catalog of the sort of practices which the FLSA was intended to
prohibit., 259
It was based on these practices that the policy
considerations of the FLSA were implicated as the fundamental reason
for denying unapproved settlement in the Eleventh Circuit.2 6 °
The major split from Lynn's Food Stores came from Bohis Bearing
Equipment in the Western District Court of Texas. Bohls Bearing
Equipment took a thorough approach to analyzing the case law and
statutory precedent of private settlement approval; O'Neil and Ganji
were both taken into consideration, as well as a slew of cases prior to
1945 which hindered the concept of private settlement under the
FLSA.261 However, unlike most of the cases that had ruled on private
("[T]he Court holds that, according to the language of the FLSA, its amendment by the Portal-toPortal Act of 1947 and the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, and its interpretation in the
case law, parties may reach private compromises as to FLSA claims where there is a bona fide
dispute as to the amount of hours worked or compensation due.").
254. See Lynn's Food Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d at 1352-53.
255. See id.at 1352.
256. Id.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. Id. at 1354.
260. See id. at 1354-55.
261. See Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 619-20 (W.D. Tex.
2005).
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settlements, Bohis Bearing Equipment actually incorporated the FLSA
amendments that proceeded after O 'Neil and Gangi.26 2 In Bohis Bearing
Equipment, it was remarked that "[t]he Portal-to-Portal Act is also
generally viewed as a direct response to the decisions in O'Neil and
Gangi. '263 "This suggests that a Congress relatively contemporary with
the passage of the FLSA in 1938 viewed these decisions as contrary to
Similarly, the Fair Labor Standards
the intent of the FLSA. 26 4
Amendments of 1949 consisted of a Congress contemporary to that of
the original FLSA and was illustrative of the availability of compromise
between employer and employee.26 5 It was under the influence of these
statutory revisions that the possibility of compromise was allowed for
under the FLSA.266
The Fifth Circuit would eventually echo this sentiment in Martin.267
The Fifth Circuit carved out an exception from the rule prohibiting
employee waiver of FLSA claims and allowing for the private
compromise of claims under the FLSA where there exists a bona fide
dispute as to liability.268 Despite the Fifth Circuit, "[t]he trend among
district courts is to continue subjecting FLSA settlements to judicial
scrutiny. 26 9 But this trend is by no means a well-established one.27°
It has been theorized that this circuit split can possibly be
recognized by the vastly different facts leading to different procedural
implications. Martin, was decided on the factual predicate of prelitigation settlements, in which a bona fide dispute still existed between
the parties. 27' Because a bona fide dispute existed, the employees were
able to agree upon a settlement after being fully advised by legal
This has the effect of preventing "abuses by unscrupulous
counsel.2 72 273
employers.
262. See id. at 633.
263. Id. at 623; see also United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 862 (5th Cir.
1975).

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Martinez, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
See id. at 626.
See id. at 631.
See Martin v. Spring Break '83 Prods., L.L.C., 688 F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cit. 2012).
Id.

269. LORIWH REPORT LETrER, No. 1142, LABOR & EMPL. L. (C.C.H.), 2015 WL 9010403
(Aug. 27, 2015).
270. Compare Dees v. Hydrary, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1234-35 (M.D. Fla. 2010); with

Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
271.
272.

See Martin, 688 F.3d at 255, 257.
See id. at 257.

273. See Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 207 (2d Cir. 2015); see also
Gaughan v. Rubenstein, 16 Civ. 8062 (PAE)(KHP), 2017 WL 2964818, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 11,
2017).
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To the contrary, Lynn's Food Stores specifically involves an
exploitative arrangement in which an uninformed party waives its
statutory right under the FLSA.2 74 It has been theorized that:
The primary difference between the Lynn's Food and
Martin standards is the timing of the judicial scrutiny.
The Fifth Circuit scrutinized the agreement in Martin at
some point after the parties entered it once a question
arose over the settlement's enforceability. Thus, Martin
stands for retrospective scrutiny to determine the
agreement's enforceability ex post ....

In contrast, the

Lynn's Food standard is applied prospectively to
approve the agreement ex ante.275

This ideology has begun to take root in 2nd Circuit
jurisprudence.2 76 With any luck, future case law will distinguish
between ex post pre-litigation settlements and ex ante litigation
settlements.
. Arbitrationas an Alternative
After Cheeks, the question presented to the Southern District of
New York was whether arbitration still stood as a viable method for
FLSA dispute resolution.277 In Moton v. Maplebear Inc., the plaintiff
agreed to an Independent Contractor Agreement, which resulted in all
claims being subjected to arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.278
Moton alleged that he was misclassified as an independent contractor,
and thus eligible for employee protections under the FLSA. 279 The
274. See Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982).
275. Kraus v. PA Fitll, LLC, 155 F. Supp. 3d 516, 528 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
276. See, e.g., Gaughan, 2017 WL 2964818, at *7; Peralta v. Soundview at Glen Cove, Inc.,
No. 11-CV-0867 (JS)(AKT), 2013 WL 2147792, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2013).
277. See Moton v. Maplebear Inc., No. 15 Civ. 8879 (CM), 2016 WL 616343, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 9, 2016).
278. 1d. at *1-2 (stating within section 7.1 of the agreement that "the Parties agree that to the
fullest extent permitted by law, any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or relating to the
Services performed by the Contractor, this Agreement, the breach, termination, interpretation,
enforcement, validity, scope and applicability of any such agreement, or any allegations of
discrimination or harassment on any basis under federal, state, or local law, which could otherwise
be heard before any court of competent jurisdiction... , shall be submitted to and determined
exclusively by binding arbitration.") Moton also agreed to the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 2)
being the governing law, as well as an express waiver of the right to a jury trial. See id. at *2.
279. Seeid.at*1.
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defense motioned to compel arbitration and the four factor test was
initiated.28 °
Initially, it was necessary to determine if FLSA claims were even
arbitrable. Plaintiff argued that Barrentine and Cheeks rendered FLSA
claims nonarbitrable, but the Southern District of New York refuted
this. 281 The court distinguished Barrentineon factual considerations that
did not align with the plaintiffs contention.282 Cheeks was also quickly
dispelled with, but the court felt compelled by the Cheeks decision to
subject any settlement to arise from arbitration to court approval. 283 It
was also noted that the confidentiality requirements of arbitration would
not be a detrimental factor because court approval would be determined
after the arbitration process reached its conclusion.284 All in all,
arbitration was able to accompany FLSA claims despite a hollow victory
due to the inevitability of court approval.
The Eastern District of New York came to a similar conclusion in
the sister case of Bynum v. Maplebear Inc.285 Later that year, the
Eastern District of New York would even approve of an arbitration
deadline for FLSA grievances, so long as they did not eliminate an
individual's ability to vindicate their statutory rights.286 Arbitration still
stands as a viable solution for FLSA claims, but the glaring problems of
the Cheeks decision still persist in the lack of confidentiality and the
need for court approval that follow an arbitration decision.
V. THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS

It must be noted that the issues presented in this article are in no
way a comprehensive collection of the multitude of problems that have
emerged following the Cheeks decision. This article is more useful as a
tool to provide insight and historical context to the legal trajectory of our
280. See id. at *3 ("[F]irst, it must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; second, it
must determine the scope of that agreement; third, if federal statutory claims are asserted, it must

consider whether Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and fourth, if the court
concludes that some, but not all, of the claims in the case are arbitrable, it must then decide whether
to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration.")
281. Seeid.at*5-6.
282. See id.
at *6.
283. See id.
284. See id.
at *9 ("[W]hile the proceedings and award are otherwise confidential in nature, the
parties may disclose information regarding the arbitration "as necessary in connection with a
judicial challenge to or enforcement of an Award, or [if] otherwise required by law or judicial
decision.").
285. 'See Bynum v. Maplebear Inc., 160 F. Supp. 3d 527, 541 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
286. See Alfonso v. Maggies Paratransit Corp., 203 F. Supp. 3d 244, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
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current treatment of the FLSA. With that being said, it is now important
to theorize on how practically approaching the Cheeks decision could be
improved upon, so as to alleviate the current burden placed on the
already overburdened judicial system. It is clear that Cheeks has done
much to disrupt the average docket, as well as cause employee's and
employer's attorneys to fear. This brings to question whether the
approval of settlements is the best usage of judicial resources. Whether
it is best for our plaintiffs. Whether it is best for society.
A. Confidentiality, Deference or Sunshine
There are certain parts of Cheeks that seem indisputable. It seems
that confidentiality and the FLSA are at odds with each other. 287 There
is no foreseeable way to meet the legislative goals of the FLSA while
maintaining confidentiality in FLSA settlements. For this reason,
confidentiality must remain. However, it would also seem that the
court's approval process is too arbitrary to be applied consistently. 288 A
jurist who has served as a public servant all her life may chop attorney's
fees in half without a second consideration, while jurists converted from
the private sector may prove to be much more generous in their
perception of attorney's fees. A totality of the circumstances approach is
taken in assessing the FLSA settlement, but this assessment should give
the highest degree of deference to the parties submitting the agreement.
Judges do not know what went into all the negotiations that led up to the
settlement. With their limited knowledge, they cannot impute their
sense of what is proper upon a plaintiff. This is largely illogical, and
relatively paternalistic.
Congress may be inspired by Sunshine in Litigation Acts, which
prohibit confidentiality in settlements that contravene public safety.2 89
Florida has led this push on the state level,29 ° which has been reflected in
287. See Ronald L. Burdge, Bad for Clients, Bad for Lawyers, Bad for Justice, 29 NO. 6
GPSOLo 25, 25-26 (2012) ("Society itself might be better off if all settlements were-public
knowledge. Wrongful conduct would be exposed not just for the economic justice of the victim, but
for the broader societal purpose of curbing such wrongful conduct. Lawmakers and the public can
see where problems exist, both in products and service suppliers, and act appropriately.... Secrecy
in settlements also hurts lawyers. A lawyer cannot place a fair and reasonable value on a case when
the lawyer cannot compare it to other known cases. It is particularly harmful to inexperienced
lawyers who may be most prone to undervaluing a case. The secrecy allows the perpetrator to assess
a fair value while preventing the innocent victim from doing likewise.").
288. See Elizabeth Wilkins, Silent Workers, DisappearingRights: ConfidentialSettlements and
the FairLabor StandardsAct, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 109, 144 (2013).
289. See Sunshine in Litigation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 1990).
290. See id.
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the Eleventh Circuit decision of Lynn's Food Stores.29 1 , • A similar
version of the Florida statute emerged in U.S. Congress in 2015 under
the name of "Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2015. ' '292 The bill was
sponsored by Jerrold Nadler, the current representative for New York's
10th congressional district, on May 14, 2015.293 The bill would prohibit
courts from: (1) enforcing any provision of an agreement that restricts a
party from disclosing information to any federal or state agency with
authority to enforce laws regulating an activity; or (2) enforcing any
provision of a settlement agreement that prohibits a party from
disclosing the presence of a settlement or the terms thereof that involve
matters relevant to the protection of public health and safety.294 The bill
died in Congress, but has been reintroduced by Jerrold Nadler in 2017.295
With any luck, the agreed upon provisions may accurately enunciate
what settlements contravene public policy, as well as what jurists should
look for when assessing settlements.
B. Ex Post Pre-Litigation Settlements and Ex Ante Litigation
Settlements
Lynn's Food Stores and Martin are not diametrically opposed. For
ex ante settlements, as was the case in Martin, "the interests of the
parties are aligned" in disposing of the litigation due to a bona fide
dispute of fact. 296 In ex post, "[t]he dividing point ... is significant
because it changes the interest structure of the parties," as was the case
in Lynn's Food Stores.2 97 With the procession of litigation brings
numerous implications, discovery being chief among them. Once a
forecast becomes results, the balance tips. "A court focusing on the
direct costs of broader discovery from an ex post perspective, would
miss the pre-dispute agreement's potential for discouraging litigation
and encouraging settlement, both effects reducing public litigation costs
and delay., 298 This solution would be received well by practitioners,
seeing as it would significantly ease their burdeng in the" settlement
process.
291.

See Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 1982).

292. See Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2015, H.R. 2336, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015).
293. See id.
294. See id. § 1660(a)(1)-(c)(1).
295. See Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 1053, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).
296. Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante
Perspective on ContractualizedProcedures,91 TEX. L. REv. 1475, 1484 (2013).
297. Id. at 1483.
298. Id. at 1487.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The history of labor in America has been marred by numerous
challenges in the legal system. The Cheeks decision is just another
challenge in this collection. Post-Cheeks settlements have changed the
landscapes of FLSA litigation, but there is still more that needs to be
developed and reconciled. With this much confusion in the settlement
process, change will come. For now, it is imperative that practitioners
and jurists, alike, adjust to the Cheeks approval.
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